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NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendants request this Honorable Court review a 
final Order Denying their Motion to Set Aside Default and Default 
Judgment entered on the 26th day of August, 1985, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by denying 
the Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the Trial 
Court's Default Judgment entered herein? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendants' counsel engaged in several conver-
sations with the Plaintiff's counsel prior to the commencement of 
these proceedings in an attempt to negotiate a settlement of the 
parties' respective claims. (R. 32) 
Defendants' counsel made a settlement offer to Plain-
tiff's counsel on behalf of the Defendants approximately one 
month prior to the filing of the Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 33) 
The Defendants' counsel asserts that Plaintiff's 
counsel, during the conversation, stated he believed said offer 
acceptable but that the Plaintiff was without the State of Utah 
and he would advise Defendants' counsel of the Plaintiff's 
decision at the earliest possible date but failed to contact the 
Defendants' counsel thereafter. (R. 33) The Plaintiff's counsel 
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disputed that the Defendants made a settlement offer to the 
Plaintiff. (R. 40) 
The Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on the 14th day of 
March, 1985. (R. 2) The Defendants, Allwin W. Pierce and 
Vennadel Pierce, were served with a copy of the Plaintiff's 
Complaint and Summons on the 30th day of Marchf 1985. (R. 7-12) 
The Summons demanded that the Defendants' answer the Plaintiff's 
Complaint within thirty (30) days of service upon them. (R. 7, 
10) 
Counsel for the Defendants and counsel for the Plain-
tiff engaged in several conversations subsequent to the filing of 
the Plaintiff's Complaint on the 14th day of March, 1985, and the 
subject of those conversations was settlement negotiations. (R. 
38, 40) 
The Defendants, Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce, 
delivered the Summons and Complaint to their counsel on the 5th 
day of April, 1985. (R. 33) 
The Defendants' counsel immediately telephoned the 
Plaintiff's counsel and tendered to him another offer of settle-
ment at which time the Plaintiff's counsel stated that he would 
contact the Plaintiff and inform the Defendants' counsel of the 
Plaintiff's decision regarding said offer. (R. 33) The Plain-
tiff's counsel disputed that such an offer was made. (R. 40) 
Although the Plaintiff's counsel denies that "settlement offers" 
were made on behalf of the Defendants he acknowledged that the 
parties were engaged in settlement negotiations. (R. 38, 40) 
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The Defendants' counsel asserts that on the 17th day of 
April, 1985, in absence of acceptance or rejection by the Plain-
tiff of the Defendants' offer of settlement, he contacted the 
Plaintiffs counsel at which time the Plaintiff's counsel informed 
him that he had been unable to convey said offer to the Plaintiff 
but would do so at the earliest possible date. (R. 33) 
The Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged that he spoke to 
the Defendants' counsel on April 17, 1985, but asserted that 
during said phone conversation he indicated that it was his 
intention to "actively litigate" the action and expected an 
Answer from the Defendants' counsel prior to the expiration of 
the time provided to answer, (R. 40) Plaintiff's counsel assert-
ed that the Defendants' counsel did not request nor did he grant 
the Defendants' counsel any extension of time in which to answer 
the Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 40) 
On April 22, 1985, the Plaintiff's counsel wrote a 
letter to the Defendants' counsel thanking the Defendants' 
counsel for his phone call of April 17, 1985, in regard to the 
law suit. (R. 43) The second paragraph of that letter states 
"Unfortunately, I was unable to communicate with Mr. Katz prior 
to his leaving town." (R. 43) The letter did not indicate why 
the Plaintiff's counsel was supposed to communicate with the 
Plaintiff. (R. 43) In the third paragraph of the April 22, 
1985, letter the Plaintiff's counsel stated that it was his 
intention to "actively litigate" this matter and that his file 
indicated that the Defendants' "...answer was due on or before 
April 20, 1985." and that if no Answer had been received by April 
3 
20th, that an Entry of Default and Default Judgment would be 
submitted to the Court. (R. 43) 
The Defendants1 counsel received this letter on the 
23rd day of April, 1985. (R. 33) 
The Defendants1 counsel immediately commenced prepara-
tion of the Defendants1 Answer and Counterclaim but such prepara-
tion was difficult and time consuming inasmuch as two of the 
Defendants named herein were residing without the State of Utah. 
(R. 34) 
All Defendants answered the Plaintiff's Complaint and 
counterclaimed against him on the 30th day of May, 1985. (R. 
18-30) 
The Defendants1 default was entered on the 30th day of 
April, 1985. (R. 13) 
On the 17th day of May, 1985, the Plaintiff's counsel 
submitted a Default Judgment and his Affidavit of Costs and 
Attorney's Fees. (R. 14-17) 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract provides that the 
buyers shall make monthly payments upon the balance of Thir-
ty-Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($33,500.00) in the sum of 
Three Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($375.00), and that a "Twenty 
Dollar ($20.00) late charge after the 10th day of any month" 
shall be paid by the buyers. (R. 6) 
The Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph five, asserts that 
the Defendants had failed to make the monthly pciyments for the 
months of December, 1984, and January, February and March, 1985, 
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in the sum of Three Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($375.00) per 
month. (R. 3) 
Paragraph seven of the Plaintiff's Complaint asserts 
that "Defendants jointly and severally owe the Plaintiff the sum 
of $1,580.00 for the arrearages and late payments described 
above." (R. 3) 
In the Prayer for Relief of the Plaintiff's Complaint 
the Plaintiff prayed for judgment against the Defendants jointly 
and severally in the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Eighty 
Dollars ($1,580.00). (R. 4) 
Paragraph two of the Prayer for Relief of the Plain-
tiff's Complaint requested "...judgment against the Defendants 
jointly and severally in the amount of such additional lease 
arrearages as may accrue during the pendency of these proceed-
ings, including late payments." (Emphasis Added) (R. 4) 
The Affidavit of Costs and Attorney's Fees submitted by 
the Plaintiff's counsel stated that said counsel spent 6.67 hours 
in the prosecution of the matter which included review of the 
initial file material supplied by the Plaintiff, preparation of 
the Complaint, preparation of the Summons and preparation of the 
default pleadings. (R. 14-15) The Plaintiff's attorney asserted 
by his Affidavit that his regular hourly rate was Seventy-Five 
Dollars ($75.00) per hour "...which is a reasonable rate for 
attorneys practicing in this area." and that Five Hundred Dollars 
($500.00) was a reasonable fee for attorney's services performed 
on the Plaintiff's behalf in the action. 
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The Default Judgment executed and entered by the Court 
on May 17, 1985, against the Defendant, Allwin W. Pierce, was in 
the sum of Two Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Dollars ($2,370.00) 
representing contract arrearages, including late penalties 
accrued for the period of December, 1984, through May, 1985, 
inclusive. (R. 16) Said judgment also awarded the Plaintiff 
attorney's fees in the amount of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) 
and costs incurred in the action in the amount of Sixty-Six 
Dollars Fifty Cents ($66.50) for a total judgment of Two Thousand 
Six Hundred Eighty-Six Dollars Fifty Cents ($2,686.50). (R. 17) 
On the 30th day of May, 1985, the Defendants Answered 
the Plaintiff's Complaint and Counterclaimed against him. (R. 
18-31). 
On the 4th day of June, 1985, the Plaintiff's counsel 
by letter notified the Defendants' counsel that the Defendants' 
Default had been entered. (R. 34-35) 
The Defendants' counsel immediately commenced prepara-
tion of the pleadings necessary to set aside the Default Judg-
ment. (R. 34-35) 
The Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and Default 
Judgment and Affidavit in support thereof were filed on the 26th 
day of June, 1985. (R. 32, 36) 
The hearing upon the Defendants' Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment was originally scheduled for the 
26th day of July, 1985, but was continued upon the motion of 
Plaintiff's counsel because the Defendants' counsel was involved 
in a trial which had continued an extra day. (R. 46, 48) 
6 
The motion was continued without prejudice to either 
party and eventually heard on the 16th day of August, 1985, 
whereupon the Court denied the Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment. (R. 51, 54, 58) The Court executed 
and entered the Order denying the Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment on the 26th day of August, 1985. 
The Plaintiff filed his reply to the Defendants1 
Counterclaim on the 26th day of August, 1985. (R. 55-56) 
The Defendants, Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce, 
filed their Notice of Appeal on the 23rd day of September, 1985. 
(R. 62) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by denying the 
Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment 
because the Plaintiff's counsel knew that the Defendants disputed 
Plaintiff's claims, the parties were engaged in settlement 
negotiations both prior to and subsequent to the service upon the 
Defendants of the Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons, the Plain-
tiff's April 22, 1985, letter, received by the Defendants' 
counsel on April 23, 1985, demanded the Complaint be answered by 
April 20, 1985, despite the requirement of the Summons that the 
Complaint be answered within thirty (30) days. Furthermore, the 
Defendants were diligent in preparation of their Answer and 
Counterclaim in light of the fact that two (2) of the Defendants 
resided without the State of Utah. No injustice or inequity to 
the Plaintiff will result should the Defendants' Motion to Set 
Aside Default and Default Judgment be granted. 
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The Trial Court entered Judgment against the Defendant, 
Allwin W. Pierce, in the principal sum of Two Thousand Three 
Hundred Seventy Dollars ($2,370.00) for contract arrearages 
accrued for the period December, 1984, through May, 1985, despite 
the Prayer for Relief of the Complaint that the Plaintiff be 
awarded judgment against the Defendants in the sum of One Thou-
sand Five Hundred Eighty Dollars ($1,580.00). The Trial Court 
failed to comply with Rules 54(c) (2) and 55(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY DENYING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Counsel for the Plaintiff and counsel for the Defen-
dants engaged in several conversations prior to the filing of the 
Plaintiff's Complaint regarding settlement of the parties' 
respective claims. The Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on the 
14th day of March, 1985, and served upon two of the Defendants, 
Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce, on the 30th day of March, 
1985. Thereafter, counsel continued to engage in settlement 
negotiations. 
The Default of the Defendants, Allwin W. Pierce and 
Vennadel Pierce, was entered on the 30th day of April, 1985, and 
Default Judgment was entered against them on the 17th day of May, 
1985, in the total sum of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty-Six 
Dollars Fifty Cents ($2,686.50). 
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All Defendants Answered the Plaintiff's Complaint and 
Counterclaimed against him on the 30th day of May, 1985. 
The Defendants filed their Motion to Set Aside Default 
and Default Judgment on the 26th day of Junef 1985, pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following 
Reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; 
•.. or (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judg-
ment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for [reason] (1) ... 
Hot more than three months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was 
Entered or taken. 
It is not disputed that the Defendants timely filed 
their Motion to set Aside Default and Default Judgment. The 
Default Judgment was entered on the 17th day of May, 1985, and 
the Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment 
was filed on the 26th day of June, 1985. (R. 16, 36) 
The T^iai Court is accorded a broad latitude of dis-
cretion in ruling upon motions presented under Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 
14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
123 Utah 2d 416v 260 P.2d 741 (1953). The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah has frequently stated that it will reverse the 
trial court only where an abuse of this discretion is clearly 
established. A movant must show that he has used "...due 
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diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circum-
stances over which he had no control." Airkem Intermountain, 
Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973). 
Although there is a broad latitude of discretion vested 
in the trial court, that "discretion should be exercised in 
furtherance of justice and should incline towcird in granting 
relief in a doubtful case to the end that a party may have a 
hearing." Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 2d 416, 260 P. 2d 
741 (1953). In Mayhew, supra, this Court stated, "...it is quite 
uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate 
a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or 
excuse for the Defendant's failure to appear, and timely applica-
tion is made to set it aside." 
It is undisputed that counsel for all parties were 
engaged in negotiations both prior to and subsequent to the 
service of the Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons upon the Defen-
dants on March 30, 1985, although Plaintiff's counsel disputed 
that the Defendants made a settlement offer. (R. 32-33, 38-41) 
The Defendants delivered the Summons and Complaint to their 
counsel on April 5, 1985, whereupon Defendants' counsel immedi-
ately telephoned the Plaintiff's counsel and tendered him another 
offer at which time the Plaintiff's counsel stated that he would 
contact the Plaintiff and then inform the Defendants' counsel of 
the decision regarding Defendants' offer. On April 17, 1985, in 
absence of acceptance or rejection of the Defendants' offer, the 
Defendants' counsel contacted the Plaintiff's counsel who 
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informed him that he had been unable to convey the offer to the 
Plaintiff but would do so at the earliest possible date. (R. 33) 
Assuming, as asserted by Plaintiff's counsel, that he 
had informed the Defendants' counsel of his intention to "active-
ly litigate" the matter on April 17, 1985, it was unreasonable to 
expect that the Defendants' counsel could file an Answer to the 
Plaintiff's Complaint before April 20f 1985, as demanded by the 
Plaintiff's counsel. 
The letter from Plaintiff's counsel to the Defendants' 
counsel dated April 22, 1985, and received by Defendants' counsel 
April 23, 1985, stated that the Answer was due on or before April 
20, 1985. The Summons, required the Defendants to Answer the 
Plaintiff's complaint within thirty (30) days from service upon 
them. The Answer would have been due April 29, 1985. 
Arguably, the Defendants had time to Answer the Plain-
tiff's Complaint. Defendants, Kent S. Larson and Ruby Larson, 
resided without the State of Utah. (R. 34) The Defendants' 
counsel stated in his Affidavit that following receipt of the 
April 22, 1985, letter he immediately commenced preparation of 
the Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim but such preparation was 
difficult and time consuming because two (2) of the Defendants 
were residing without the State of Utah. (R. 34) 
Necessarily, the communication between an attorney and 
his clients residing in another state in a law suit of this 
nature is more cumbersome and time consuming than that between an 
attorney and a client who resides locally. The attorney does not 
have the benefit of a personal interview with the client which 
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permits free, in depth inquiry into the factual basis of the 
client's claims and defenses. Such inquiry is necessary to 
insure proper pleading of the Defendants' positions and promotes 
the integrity of the judicial process by mitigating the risk of 
frivolous and inapplicable claims and defenses which lead to 
unjust results. 
The Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim was filed on 
May 30, 1985, thirteen (13) days after the Default Judgment was 
entered against the Defendant, Allwin W. Pierce. (R. 18-30) 
It is significant that the Plaintiff's counsel 
submitted his Entry of Default to the Court on April 22, 1985, 
more than a week prior to the time the Summons required that the 
answer be filed and the same day he drafted the letter demanding 
that the Defendants' answer the Plaintiff's Complaint by April 
20, 1985. (R. 41) The Defendants' counsel had no knowledge that 
the Plaintiff's counsel was pursuing a default against the 
Defendants until April 23, 1985. (R. 33-34) 
Furthermore, it may be implied from paragraph two of 
the April 22, 1985, letter that a settlement offer was pending 
because the Plaintiff's counsel was to contact his client and it 
was "Unfortunate" he was unable to do so prior to the Plaintiff 
leaving town. (R. 43) The paragraph supports the Defendants' 
counsel's assertion that he had made and was awaiting a response 
to a settlement offer. 
There are no mailing certificates upon the default 
documents submitted to the Court by the Plaintiff nor other 
evidence indicating that the Plaintiff's counsel notified the 
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Defendants' counsel of the course of conduct he was pursuing. 
Common ethics and professional courtesy among the practicing 
members of the bar, under these circumstances, dictated that the 
Plaintiff's counsel permit the Defendants' counsel the 
opportunity to communicate with his clients and prepare his 
pleadings. 
The Plaintiff's counsel notified the Defendants' 
counsel of the entry of the Default Judgment on June 4, 1985. (R. 
34-35) 
The Defendants' counsel immediately commenced prepara-
tion of the pleadings necessary to set aside the Default Judg-
ment. (R. 34-35) 
The settlement negotiations, the absence of acceptance 
or rejection of the Defendants' settlement offers, the demand 
that the Plaintiff's Complaint be answered by April 20, 1985, in 
the letter from Plaintiff's counsel received by Defendants' 
counsel on April 23, 1985, despite the thirty (30) day Summons 
and the fact that two (2) of the Defendants resided without the 
State of Utah, taken together, show that the Defendants used due 
diligence and that they were prevented from appearing by circum-
stances beyond their control. Airkem, supra. In Helgesen v. 
Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981), this Court stated: 
It is not uncommon in the practice of 
the law that when parties are negotiat-
ing settlement and one party files a 
lawsuit to bring pressure to bear, the 
other party is not strictly held to the 
time requirements of the rules of 
procedure since settlement talk contin-
ues to the day of trial and a few days' 
delay has little or no effect on 
when the trial date will be set. 
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The discretion of the trial court should be exercised 
liberally in favor of the defaulting party in order to provide 
him his day in court. Mayhew, supra. The interest of the 
Plaintiff should also be taken into consideration and the judg-
ment should not be set aside if to do so would work an injustice 
or inequity to him. Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 589 P. 2d 
767 (Utah 1978). The Plaintiff did not demonstrate that to set 
aside the Default Judgment entered against the Defendants would 
be unjust or result in inequity to him. 
Furthermore, at the time of the hearing upon the 
Defendants' motion, the Plaintiff had not replied to the Counter-
claim of the Defendants, filed some ten (10) weeks earlier. 
The Plaintiff's counsel knew that the Plaintiff's 
Complaint was disputed and had indicated his intention to "ac-
tively litigate" the matter. Despite his knowledge that the 
Plaintiff's claims were disputed and that the Defendants were 
represented by counsel he submitted his "Entry of Default" to the 
Court on April 22, 1985, and this was executed by the clerk on 
April 30, 1985. 
Fundamental fairness and justice require, under the 
circumstances of this case, that the Entry of Default and Default 
Judgment against the Defendants be set aside and the case remand-
ed to the Trial Court for a determination of whether the Defen-
dants have presented a meritorious defense by their Answer. 
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POINT II 
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph five, asserted 
that the Defendants had failed to make monthly payments for the 
months of December, 1984, and January, February, and March, 1985, 
in the sum of Three Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($375.00). (R. 
3) Paragraph seven of the Plaintiff's Complaint asserted that 
the "Defendants jointly and severally owe the Plaintiff the sum 
of $1,580.00 for the arrearages and late payments described 
above." 
Paragraph two of the Prayer for Relief of the Plain-
tiff's Complaint requested, "...judgment against the Defendants 
jointly and severally in the amount of such additional lease 
arrearages as may accrue during the pendency of these proceed-
ings, including late payments." (Emphasis Added) (R. 4) 
The Default Judgment entered on May 17, 1985, awarded 
the Plaintiff "...Judgment against the Defendants, Allwin W. 
Pierce, jointly and severally in the amount of $2,370, said sum 
representing contract arrearages, including late penalties, 
accrued for the period December, 19 84 through May 1985, inclu-
sive." (R. 16) 
Rule 54(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
Judgment by Default. A judgment by 
default shall not be different in kind 
from, or exceed in amount, that specif-
ically prayed for in the demand for 
judgment. 
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Rule 55 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides: 
Judgment by default may be entered as 
follows: (1) By the Clerk. When the 
plaintiff's claim against a defendant is 
for a sum certain or for a sum which can 
by computation be made certain, and the 
defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by 
personal service outside of this state, 
the clerk upon request of the plaintiff 
shall enter judgment for the amount due 
and costs against the defendants, if he 
had been defaulted for failure to appear 
and if he is not an infant or incompe-
tent person. 
(2) By the Court. In all other cases 
the party entitled to a judgment by 
default shall apply to the court there-
for. If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into 
effect, it is necessary to take an 
account or to determine the amount of 
damages or to establish the truth of any 
averment by evidence or to make an 
investigation of any other matter, the 
court may conduct such hearings or order 
such references as it deems necessary 
and proper. 
Unquestionably, the Trial Court entered judgment 
against the Defendants in a sum in excess of that demanded by the 
Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 2-4, 16-17) 
The Default Judgment entered against the Defendants was 
in violation of Rule 54(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure by granting the Plaintiff judgment in a sum in excess 
of that demanded by the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The Trial Court failed to follow Rule 55(b)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that it did not take steps 
"...necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of 
damages...." nor have a hearing thereupon. 
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In Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984), this 
Court stated: 
Rule 54(c)(2) and Rule 55 prescribes the 
procedure to be followed by the trial 
courts in entering judgments against 
defaulting parties. Courts are not at 
liberty to deviate from those rules just 
because one party is in default and is 
not entitled to be heard on the merits 
of the case. 
Clearly, the Default Judgment entered against the 
Defendants was well in excess of the amount prayed in the Plain-
tiff's Complaint and the Trial Court did not follow the pre-
scribed Rules in awarding the Plaintiff his judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by denying the 
Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment 
because the Plaintiff's counsel knew that the Defendants disputed 
Plaintiff's claims, the parties were engaged in settlement 
negotiations both prior to and subsequent to the service upon the 
Defendants of the Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons, the Plain-
tiff's April 22, 1985, letter, received by the Defendants' 
counsel on April 23, 1985, demanded the Complaint be answered by 
April 20, 1985, despite the requirement of the Summons that the 
Complaint be answered within thirty (30) days. The day before 
the Defendants' counsel received the letter demanding the 
Complaint be answered the Plaintiff's counsel submitted his Entry 
of Default to the Court. 
Furthermore, the Defendants were diligent in 
preparation of their Answer and Counterclaim in light of the fact 
that two (2) of the Defendants resided without the State of Utah. 
No injustice or inequity to the Plaintiff will result should the 
Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment be 
granted. 
The Trial Court entered Judgment against the Defendant, 
Allwin W. Pierce, in the principal sum of Two Thousand Three 
Hundred Seventy Dollars ($2,370.00) for contract arrearages 
accrued for the period December, 1984, through May, 1985, despite 
the Prayer for Relief of the Complaint that the Plaintiff be 
awarded judgment against the Defendants in the sum of One Thou-
sand Five Hundred Eighty Dollars ($1,580.00). The Trial Court 
failed to comply with Rules 54(c)(2) and 55(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
The Defendants seek reversal of the Trial Court's Order 
denying their Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment 
and an Order setting aside the Entry of Default and Default 
Judgment. Additionally, the Defendants request that they be 
awarded their costs and attorney's fees incurred upon the 
prosecution of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted tliia^ &th day of January, 1985. 
^Stiksfy' 
Attorney for Appellants 
100 Harmon BuiLding 
3540 South 4000(we<Jt 
West Valley CityT'Utah 84120 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and 
RUBY LARSON, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Docket No. 20924 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ooOoo 
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of January, 1985, 
I delivered to AMS four (4) copies of Appellants1 Brief for hand 
delivery to Raymond Scott Berry, Green & Berry, Attorneys for 
Respondent, at 900 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. 
ANDREW^. BERRY XTR. 
Attorney for/Appallants 
100 Harmon Bfuildijng 
3540 Sou th 4XK)0 West 
West V a l l e y C i t r / , Utah 84120 
64007 
GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
. ft ©<*>»'** 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STAN KATZ, 
VS. 
ALLWIN 
PIERCE, 
LARSON, 
Plaintiff, 
W. PIERCE, VENNJ 
KENT S. LARSON 
Defendants. 
\DEL 
AND RUBY ) 
SUMMONS 
Civil No. c^s-\y^ 
UPON' -
" — " — ' - • " - • • * > * \ : > / 
sm C0m
^^m^ PfiEc. &L com TV, UTAH 
DEPUTY 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: Allwin W. 
Us^Oc to . <RM9oS J • •—-
Pierce, 1685 W. Whitlock Avenue, salt Lake City, Utah. 
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the 
Clerk of the above-entitled Court, an answer in writing to the 
Complaint filed in the above-entitled case, and to serve upon or 
mail to Raymond Scott Berry Plaintiff's attorney, 10 Exchange 
Place, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of said 
answer, within 30 days after service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said complaint, which has 
Page -1-
been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is 
hereby annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this fck day of March, 1985. 
Defendant's address: Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Buildii 
1685 West Whitlock Avenue 10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah Salt Lake"City, Utah 84111 
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OF UTAH ) 
Y OF SALT LAKE ) CONSTABLE'S RETURN 
ItRON GORDON , being first duly sworn on oath depose and sayt 
I afr? a duly appointed Deputy Constable of the Hurray Precinct County of Salt Lake 
1
 of Utah, a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of 
e herein* and not a party to or interested in the within action* 
I received the within and hereto annexed,SUMMONS & COMPLAINT • on the 13 day of 
I , 19 85, and served the same upon,PIERCE, ALLUIN U» 
:hin named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said 
INS & COMPLAINT , by delivering to and leaving a true copy of said SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 
the defendant with, PIERCE, VENNADEL, WIFE , a suitable person over the age of 
?arstRESIDING at the usual place of RESIDENCE of said defendant, personally 
30 day of MARCH ,1985 , at 1685 U< WHITLOCK AVE* 
\y of Salt Lake, State of Utah* 
I further certify that at the time of such service of the SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 
iorsed the date and place of service and added my name and official title thereto* 
Dated this 30 day of MARCH , 1985 
JOHN A* SINDT 
Constable Murray Precinct 
Deputy 
cribed and sworn to before me this 30 day of MARCH 
©amission Expires* April 1, 1988 
Notary Vj&i\z 
«r?Tm;^ 
>f^S 
Service* 
Mileage' 
TOTAL 
: % 
$ 
\ % 
! % 
\ % 
! $ 
3*75 
4.50 
8.25 
Opun% of Salt Lake 
>? 1 5 MA 
o* *<>QG 
GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE,_VENNADEL 
.PTpppF, K-PMT S. LARSON AND RUBY 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
SUMMONS 
Civil No. d. ss"-te£& 
T*r 
/\-i tii-< 
/ 
S.i IN CO.VSIHBLE' MUHRA, i- nEC. O.L. UJ'J: r, V, J ,7„ , 
DEPUTY 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: Vennadel Pierce, 
Whitlock Avenue, Salt 1685 Lake City, Utah, 
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the 
Clerk of the above-entitled Court, an answer in writing to the 
Complaint filed in the above-entitled case, and to serve upon or 
mail to Raymond Scott Berry Plaintiff's attorney, 10 Exchange 
Place, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of said 
answer, within 30 days after service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said complaint, which has 
Page -1- it 
been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is 
hereby annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this / c*^  day of March, 1985. 
Defendant's address: Attbfney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
1685 West Whitlock Avenue 10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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nr UIAH 
Y Or SALT LAKE ) CONSTABLE'S RETURN 
It RON GORDON * being first duly sworn on oath depose and say* 
I af>< a duly appointed Deputy Constable ef the Hurray Precinct County of Salt Lake 
k
 of Utah* a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of 
e herein* and not a party to or interested in the within action* 
I received the within and hereto annexed*SUMMONS & COMPLAINT • on the 13 day of 
I
 f 19 85* and served the same upon*PIERCE> MENNAICL 
bin named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said 
INS * COMPLAINT * by delivering to a m leaving a true copy of said SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 
'he defendant with* PIERCE• VENNftDEL • a suitable person over the age of 
>ars,RESIDING at the usual place of RESIDENCE of said defendant, personally 
30 day of MARCH ,1985 * at 1685 U* WHITLOCK AVE* 
7 of Salt Lake, State of Utah* 
I further certify that at the time of such service of the SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 
iorsed the date and place of service and added my name and official title thereto* 
Dated this 30 day of MARCH • 1985 
JOHN A* SIHDT 
Constable Murray Precinct 
Deputy 
iribed and sworn to before me this 30 day of MARCH 
jmmission Expires* April 1* 1988 
Notary PuMTic 
Service4* $ 
Mileage* $ 
I $ 
• $ 
i i 
TOTAL: $ 
3*75 
I StVe of m / I 
3*?£ 
6 15 MA 
riiCD in c t r r v ' , r r r r , c 
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GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
P^ijjllN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
J IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STAN KATZ, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and 
L. LARSON, 
Defendants. 
RUBY ) 
COMPLAINT 
Civil NO. 
c85l806 
Plaintiff complains of Defendants and for a cause of 
action alleges as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff is now and was at all times mentioned 
herein a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce 
are now and were at all times mentioned herein residents of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. Defendants Kent S. Larson and Ruby 
L. Larson were, at the times mentioned herein, residents of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Plaintiff alleges upon his information and belief 
that Defendants Kent S. Larson and Ruby L. Larson on or about 
January 15, 1985, ceased to reside in Salt Lake County, State of 
Page -1-
Utah. 
4. That on or about June 9, 1984, Plaintiff and 
Defendants entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract whereby 
Defendants purchased from Plaintiff certain real property 
consisting of a family residence located at 342 South 10th West 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. A true and correct copy of said 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, including a legal description of 
the above-mentioned property, is attached hereto and made a part 
hereof by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit f,AM. 
5. That the above-mentioned Defendants have failed to 
make the monthly payments called for by the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract for the months of December, 1984, and January, February 
and March, 1985. The contract specifies that monthly payments 
are to be in the amount of $375.00 per month. In addition, the 
above-mentioned Uniform Real Estate Contract specifies a $20.00 
late charge for monthly payments made after the 10th day of any 
calendar month. 
6. Plaintiff demanded that Defendants pay the 
above-mentioned monthly payments, but said demands have been 
refused and/or ignored by Defendants. 
7. Defendants jointly and severally owe Plaintiff the 
sum of $1,580.00 for the arrearages and late payments described 
above. 
8. Plaintiff further alleges on information and belief 
that Defendants will fail to make additional monthly payments 
Page -2-
required by the above-mentioned contract while this action is 
pending. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendants jointly and severally as follows: 
1. For judgment against the Defendants jointly and 
severally in the amount of $1,580.00. 
2. For judgment against the Defendants jointly and 
severally in the amount of such additional lease arrearages as 
may accrue during the pendency of these proceedings, including 
late payments. 
3. For reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the 
Plaintiff in pursuing this action and as provided for by the 
above-mentioned contract, a reasonable attorney's fee accuring at 
the rate of $75.00 per hour. 
4. For interest before and after judgment at the rate of 
13% per annum as provided for by the contract, costs of court, 
and such other and further relief as the court may deem just and 
equitable in the premises. 
DATED this fc*C day of March, 1985. 
GREEN, HIGGINS & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry / ) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Plaintiff's address: 
3703 Honeycut Road 
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
"This is a legally binding form, if not understood, seek competent advice." 
* ^ - _ _ , A . D , 1 9 l l day of 1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this t 
by and between 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and £ j 
/J t^_ 
frgjkJLhlLfrr., 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for tijo consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
jSflli-MlJtt. State of Utah, to-wit: B ^ X J ^ A i P P O 1 ^ - U X i l / « *T the county of —  
ADDRESS 
>«-^f%/*//**f * 
> 3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum^pf __— 
~7kl\r\ZZ f^w^>KowjW FM* ifatjJtftoJ Dollars ( $ 3 ^ J £ 0 & J ^ ) 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns ororder ~~~^~ 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: JLJu C 1 t\<*»JbL^ A3L VO 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $__£)LIL_J shall be paid as follows: 
trio - fat*. C 4 H < . 4 ^ " # « 1*w <**i*f *•»]*»»% 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property. 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Sailer in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to nim. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said promises in good condition. 
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within . T^ v j A C M days thereafter, the 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: ** 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subjeca thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgement for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such a time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, mil III Till lii ill nl bin 111 j j m jnilLii ~nP""f il li in 1 mini ;-• t1-- ^" ' - in t 
"
n i
^ r , 11T.bi1''in P v l V , n " r '-)*' f i l l ' ^ p * ; ' " M ) f t [ ] j - » j j ^ ^ ^ ; j ^ y - " i ^ ^ « • * • > • » • • • f••»•*'*• '"«» ««• ' " " • • "-r M,I • •• . y <».»» , 1 . ^ . ; ^ . | i ^ 
Inmii nir i l l f • • • [ • — • ' J i r i t [ jm f i l i l ' m i j u f ilmiilj nl liln iijiliiiiu uf i h i j m i 
20. It i« hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto . 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or • - - . . _i_i.„:_:_„.
 n^OAlaoinn ^f tha nrpinisfls covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
APR 30 10 S7 ftH #65 
GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON, and 
RUBY LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce, having 
been regularly served with process and Complaint in the 
above-entitled action, and having failed to answer or respond to 
the same, the time to answer or respond having elapsed, and upon 
motion of the Plaintiff, the default of Defendants Allwin W. 
Pierce and Vennadel Pierce is hereby entered according to law. 
DATED this 3 $ clay of April, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
H. D/X0N HfNDLEY 
J 
Clerk of the District Court 
JK38 
P a g e - 1 - h 
H. 1>A uLERK 
it. : , u 
BY JLLI ^ c<^ *~J±-LL 
. . .\TGLERK 
ENTRY OF DEFAULT 
Civil No. 
GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
MAY 1 7 1985 
By D&puty Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON, AND 
RUBY LARSON, 
Defendant. 
&4. /97 A'? J ^ 7 -
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C85-1606 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
) 
The Default of the Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and 
Vennadel Pierce was duly entered according to law on April 30, 
1985. Said default having been entered, this Court hereby 
enters Default Judgment against Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and 
Vennadel Pierce as follows: 
JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against Defendants 
Allwin W. Pierce, jointly and severally in the amount of 
$2,370, said sum representing contract arrearages, including 
late penalties, accrued for the period December, 1984 through 
May 1985, inclusive. 
2. Paragraph 21 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
between Plaintiffs and Defendants provides for an award of 
reasonable attorney's fees. Pursuant to that provision, this 
Court awards Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
the prosecution of this action in the amount of $500.00. 
3. Plaintiff is further awarded reasonable costs 
incurred in this action in the amount of $66.50. 
TOTAL JUDGMENT: $2686.50 
JK40 
DATED this / / day of May, 1985. 
BY THE COURT; 
Judge of the District Court 
D=»^^ O 
ANDREW B. BERRY JR. 0309 "' . 
BERRY, LARSEN & FARR Mtv 30 U 39 ^ K ^ 
Attorneys for Defendants ™ l **—*\ 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 400 ^_ lODt^V/^1*-* 9^P.\ri*^ 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 r^A^^ *- «V "Uf"~ ^ 
^ 7) Telephone: 967-3700 C^A " Et — T'.TTT 
^v I A - ^ IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and 
RUBY LARSON, 
Defendants, 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. C 85 1606 
Assigned to: 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
ooOoo 
COME NOW the Defendants by and through their attorney, 
Andrew B. Berry Jr., answering the Plaintiff's Complaint as 
follows: 
1. The Defendants admit the express allegations of 
paragraph one the of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. The Defendants admit that Allwin W. Pierce and 
Vennadel Pierce are residents of Salt Lake County within the 
State of Utah, but deny each and every other allegation of 
paragraph two of the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
3. The Defendants admit that Kent S. Larson and Ruby 
Larson are residents of the State of New Mexico, but deny each 
and every other allegation of paragraph three of the Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
4. The Defendants admit that on or about the 9th day 
of June, 1984, the Plaintiff and the Defendants entered into 
Uniform Real Estate Contract upon the real property situate at 
342 South 1000 West in the City of Salt Lake in the County of 
Salt Lake within the State of Utah, and that a true and correct 
copy of said Uniform Real Estate Contract is attached to the 
Plaintiff's Complaint but deny each and every other allegation of 
paragraph four of the Plaintiff's Complaint and affirmatively 
assert that said contract is of no legal effect and voidable 
inasmuch as it was procurred by the Plaintiff's fraud and false 
representation of material facts. 
5, The Defendants admit that they have not made the 
monthly payments under the Uniform Real Estate Contract for the 
months of December, 1984, and January, February, March, 1985, and 
that said Uniform Real Estate Contract specifies monthly payments 
in the amount of Three Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($375.00) and 
a late charge as set forth in the Plaintiff's Complaint but deny 
each and every other allegation of paragraph five of the 
Plaintiff's Complaint and affirmatively assert that they are not 
obligated to make said monthly payments inasmuch as the contract 
is voidable and procurred by the Plaintiff's fraud and that the 
Plaintiff made false representation of material fact knowing said 
representations were false and for the purpose of defrauding the 
Defendant. Furthermore, the Defendants allege that they were not 
obligated to make the payments specified in paragraph five of the 
Plaintiff's Complaint inasmuch as the parties have effected an 
accord and satisfication. 
2 
6. The Defendants admit that Plaintiff has demanded 
they make the above-mentioned monthly payments but deny each and 
every other allegation of paragraph six of the Plaintifffs 
Complaint and affirmatively assert that said Defendants are not 
obligated to make said payments because the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was procurred by fraud and misrepresentation. 
Furthermore, the Defendants affirmatively assert that any duty 
which may have existed to make said monthly payments was relieved 
by the accord and satisfaction between the parties. 
7. The Defendants deny each and every allegation of 
paragraph seven of the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
8. The Defendants admit that they shall not make 
further payments pursuant to said contract and affirmatively 
assert that the Defendants have no obligation to make said 
payments to the Plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For their first, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants assert that 
the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted. 
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WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For their second, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that 
the Contract upon which the Plaintiff is suing is voidable 
because it was procurred by the Plaintiff's fraud in that, inter 
alia, the Plaintiff falsely represented to the Defendants that 
the dwelling which is the subject of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was twenty-five (25) years old, in good condition and 
not in need of repair. The Defendants reasonably and justifiably 
relied upon the Plaintiff's representation of material fact and 
the Plaintiff made said representations knowing they were false 
for the purpose of defrauding the Defendants. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For their third, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that 
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the contract of which the Plaintiff is suing is voidable because 
it was procurred by the Plaintiff's innocent but negligent 
misrepresentation, inter alia, the dwelling was only twenty-five 
(25) years old, in good condition and not in need of repair. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For their fourth, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that 
the contract alleged in the Plaintiff's Complaint to have been 
made by Defendants was so made without consideration. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For their fifth, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that 
there has been a total failure of consideration for the contract 
in question. 
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WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For his sixth, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendant, Kent S. 
Larson, asserts that he did not execute nor did he authorize the 
execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which is the 
subject of this action. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For their seventh, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that 
on or about the 15th day of January, 1985, the parties entered 
into and fully performed an accord and satisfication. The terms 
of said accord and satisfaction were that the Defendants herein 
would quit-claim all right, title and interest in the subject 
real property dwelling to the Plaintiff and thereupon would be 
released from further obligation in law and equity and from the 
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terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which is the subject of 
this action. 
Thereafter, the Defendants quit-claimed said real 
property and dwelling to the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff took 
possession thereof fully performing the terms of said accord and 
satisfaction. 
The Plaintiff subsequently advertised said real 
property for sale in the classified advertisments of the Salt 
Lake Tribune on the first, second, third and fourth days of 
February, 1985. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorneyfs 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For their eighth, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that 
the Plaintiff has failed to properly notify them of their default 
and his election of remedy pursuant to the provisions of 
paragraph 16 of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
7 
7 8-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For their ninth, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that 
the Plaintiff's claim is barred by the equitable doctrine of 
estoppel. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For their tenth, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that 
the Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the equitable doctrine of 
waiver. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
For their eleventh, separate and distinct affirmative 
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that 
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the Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the equitable doctrine of 
Laches. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon 
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-27-56 and such other and further relief as this Court 
determines just, equitable and proper. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COME NOW the Defendants (hereinafter Counterclaimants) 
counterclaiming against the Plaintiff as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. The Counterclaimants, Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel 
Pierce, are residents of Salt Lake County within the State of 
Utah. 
2. The Counterclaimants, Kent S. Larson and Ruby L. 
Larson, are residents of the State of New Mexico. 
3. The Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County 
within the State of Utah. 
4. The real property which is the subject of this 
action situate at 342 South 1000 West Street is in Salt Lake 
County within the State of Utah. 
5. On or about the 9th day of June, 1984, the 
Counterclaimants, as purchasers, and the Plaintiff, as vendor, 
entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contrct for the sale and 
purchase of the real property situate at 342 South 1000 West 
Street in Salt Lake County within the State of Utah. 
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6. The Plaintiff, prior to the execution of the 
above-referenced contract, falsely represented to the 
Counterclaimants that the dwelling upon said real property was no 
older than twenty-five (25) years and in execellent condition not 
in need of repair when, in fact, said dwelling is in excess of 
fifty (50) years old and in need of extensive repair. 
7. The Plaintiff used said false representations to 
induce the Counterclaimants to enter into the above-referenced 
Uniform Real Estate Contract knowing his representations to be 
false and material. 
8. The Counterclaimants would not have entered into 
said Uniform Real Estate Contract had they been informed of the 
true age and condition of said dwelling but for said inducement. 
9. The Counterclaimants acted reasonably in relying 
upon the representations of the Plaintiff and were overreached 
thereby. 
10. The Plaintiff falsely represented to the 
Counterclaimants, Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce, that they 
could quit-claim their interest to the Counterclaimants, Kent S. 
Larson and Ruby Larson, thereby releasing Allwin W. Pierce and 
Vennadel Pierce, from all obligations in law and equity to pay 
the sums due and owing under the above-referenced Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. 
11. The Plaintiff used said false representations to 
induce the Counterclaimants to enter into said Uniform Real 
Estate Contract knowing his representations to be false and 
material. 
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12. The Counterclaimants, Allwin W. Pierce and 
Vennadel Pierce, would not have entered into said Uniform Real 
Estate Contract had they been informed of the true effect of said 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and Quit-Claim Deed and but for said 
inducement. 
13. The Counterclaimants, Allwin W. Pierce and 
Vennadel Pierce, acted reasonably in relying upon the Plaitniff's 
representations and were overreached thereby. 
14. The Counterclaimants are entitled to rescission of 
said Uniform Real Estate Contract and the return of all sums 
heretofore tendered to the Plaintiff. 
15. The Plaintiff is liable in exemplary damages for 
his fraud upon the Counterclaimants and judgment should be 
entered in the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) 
therefore. 
16. The Plaintiff is liable for all costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herein to the Counterclaimants and 
judgment should be entered in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000.00) therefore, but subject to amendment at trial. 
WHEREFORE, the Counterclaimants pray judgment against 
the Plaintiff as set forth below. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
17. The Counterclaimants reallege and incorporate as 
though fully set forth herein each and every allegation of their 
First Cause of Action. 
18. In and about the month of January, 1985, the 
Plaintiff and the Counterclaimants entered into an agreement 
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whereby Counterclaimants would forfeit all right, title and 
interest in the subject real property and be released from all 
obligation in law and equity to pay any sums due and owing under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract heretofore referenced. 
19. In and about the month of January, 19 85, the 
Counterclaimants vacated said real property and tendered to the 
Plaintiff a Quit-Claim Deed upon said real property and the key 
to the dwelling. 
20. In and about the month of January, 1985, the 
Plaintiff took possession of said real property and advertised 
said real property and dwelling for sale on four separate 
occasions in the Salt Lake Tribune. 
21. Said agreement constitutes an accord and 
satisfication between the parties hereto. 
22. The Plaintiff has breached his agreement with the 
Counterclaimants and has attempted to enforce the provisions of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract heretofore referenced. 
23. The Counterclaimants are entitled to all costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herein in the sum of Five Thousand 
Dollars ($5,000.00), but subject to amendment at trial, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-56. 
WHEREFORE, the Counterclaimants pray judgment against 
the Plaintiff as set forth below. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Rescission of the subject Uniform Real Estate 
Contract; 
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2. Restitution of all sums paid by the 
Counterclaimants to the Plaintiff; 
3. Costs of suit and attorney's fees incurred herein 
in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), but subject to 
amendment at trial; 
4. Exemplary damages in the sum of Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($50,000.00); and, 
5. Such other further relief as this court determines 
just, equitable and proper. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Rescission of the subject Uniform Real Estate 
Contract; 
2. Judgment upon the accord and satisfaction entered 
into between the parties; 
3. Release in law and equity from all obligations 
under said Uniform Real Estate Contract; and, 
4. Costs of suit and attorney's fees incurred herein 
in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), but subject to 
amendment at trial; 
5. Such other further relief as this court determines 
just, equitable and proper^ 
DATED this(//T day ofJ4ay—-i£&^. 
ANDREW B. BBJRRY\JR# 
Attorney £<5r Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 
mailed a true and correct cc 
Counterclaim, postage prepaid, 
for Plaintiff, at 900 Newhouse 
Lake City, Utah 84111. 
on this cQ% day of May, 1985, I 
py of the foregoing Answer and 
to Raymond Scott Barry, attorney 
Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt 
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ANDREW B. BERRY 0309 
BERRY, LARSEN & FARR 
Attorneys for Defendant 
100 Harmon Building 
3540 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: 967-3700 
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DEPUTY CLE r< 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and 
RUBY LARSON, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C 85 1606 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW the Defendants by and through their attorney, 
Andrew B. Berry Jr., pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and for just, legal and factual 
cause moves this Court for an Order setting aside Default and 
Default Judgment previously entered in this action on the ground 
that counsel for each of the parties were engaged in negotiation. 
This motion is supported by the Affidavit, attached 
hereto and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 
DATED this /n day of June, 1985. 
/MDREW B. BERRY/fR. 
Attorney for Dtff^ ndants 0 
CERTICIATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this | / day of June, 1985, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion, postage 
prepaid, to Raymond Scott Berry, attorney for Plaintiff, at 900 
Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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BERRY, LARSEN & FARR JllH 2B 9 38 RM B§ 
Attorneys for Defendant .,
 CB-
100 Harmon Building H. D i ^ • - R T £ 
3540 South 4000 West »^ 5*°i»;>' - J £ % 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 ^ V ^ * * ^ 
Telephone: 967-3700 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and 
RUBY LARSON, 
A F F I D A V I T 
C i v i l N o . C 85 1606 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Andrew B. Berry Jr., being first duly sworn upon my 
oath, depose and say: 
1. I am an attorney at law in good standing and duly 
authorized to practice law in the State of Utah. 
2. I represent the Defendants herein. 
3. The facts herein stated are based upon my 
knowledge and personal observations. 
4. I had engaged in several conversations with 
Raymond Scott Berry, attorney for the Plaintiff, prior to the 
commencement of these proceedings in an attempt to negotiate a 
settlement of the parties respective claims. 
5. I made a settlement offer to Plaintiff's attorney 
on behalf of the Defendants approximately one month prior to the 
filing of Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff counsel stated he 
believed said offer acceptable but that the Plaintiff was 
without the State of Utah. Said counsel stated he would advise 
me of the Plaintiff's decision at the earliest possible date. 
The Plaintiff's counsel failed to contact me thereafter. The 
Defendants, Alwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce, were served 
with a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons on or about the 
30th day of March, 1985. 
6. The Defendants, Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel 
Pierce, delivered said Summons and Complaint to me on the 5th 
day of April, 1985. 
7. I immediately telephoned the Plaintiff's counsel 
and tendered to him another offer of settlement at which time he 
stated that he would contact the Plaintiff and then inform me of 
the Plaintiff's decision regarding said offer. 
8. On or about the 17th day of April, 1985, in 
absence of acceptance or rejection by the Plaintiff of the 
Defendants' offer of settlement, I contacted the Plaintiff's 
counsel at which time he informed me that he had been unable to 
convey said offer to the Plaintiff but would do so at the 
earliest possible date. 
9. On or about the 23rd day of April, 1985, I 
received from the Plaintiff's counsel a letter stating that his 
intention was to "actively litigate" this matter. A copy of 
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said letter is attached hereto and incorporated as though fully 
set forth herein. 
10. Said letter demanded that the Plaintiff's 
Complaint be answered prior to the 20th day of April, despite 
the declaration of the Plaintiff's Summons that said Complaint 
be answered within thirty (30) days from the date of service 
thereof. 
11. The Defendants, Kent S. Larson and Ruby Larson, 
reside without the State of Utah and have not been served with 
the Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons herein. 
12. I immediately commenced preparation of the 
Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim but such preparation was 
difficult and time consuming inasmuch as two of the Defendants 
named herein reside without the State of Utah. 
13. On or about the 30th day of May, 1985, the 
Defendants answered the Plaintiff's Complaint and counterclaimed 
against him. A copy of the Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim 
is attached hereto and incorporated as though fully set forth 
herein. 
14. The Plaintiff's counsel entered the default of 
the Defendants despite his personal knowledge that the 
Defendants were represented by counsel and without informing me 
that the default of the Defendants had been entered. 
15. On or about the 4th day of June, 1985, I received 
from the Plaintiff's attorney a letter stating that he had 
entered the Default of my clients whereupon I immediately 
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commenced preparation of the pleadings necessary to set aside 
said default wrongfully taken. 
16. I am of the opinion that the Defendants have a 
valid defense to the claims of the Plaintiff and are entitled to 
have their cause heard upp^ its merits, 
DATED this l^j day of JUJJS-T—t8ij5. 
June, 19 85, 
My Commission Expires: 
8/28/85 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before mfe this day of 
Residing Salt Lake County, 
CERTICIATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ]vj day of June, 1985, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the ' foregoing Affidavit, 
postage prepaid, to Raymond Scott Berry, attorney for Plaintiff, 
at 900 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
%k QMA \ 
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ANDREW B. BERRY 0 309 
BERRY, LARSEN & FARR 
Attorneys for Defendant 
100 Harmon Building 
3540 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
<^ tfhone: 967-3700 r^e 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE' OF UTAH 
OOOoo 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and 
RUBY LARSON, 
Defendants. 
00O00 
TO THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY: 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Civil No. C 85 1606 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
You and each of you will please take notice that 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment has 
been scheduled at the above-entitled Court, 451 South 200 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, Third Judicial District Court Judge, on the iJo " day 
of <JULU I 1985, at the hour of jfK'QC tf »*"» , or as soon 
thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED this r i day of Ju 
-ANDREW B". BERRY JR.I 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTICIATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this \\ day of June, 1985, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice, postage 
prepaid, to Raymond Scott Berry, attorney for Plaintiff, at 900 
Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt LakeCity, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and 
RUBY LARSON, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-85-1606 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff Stan Katz through his undersigned counsel, 
hereby objects to Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Default Judgment dated June 14, 1985. Plaintiff's objections 
to said Motion are supported by the Affidavit of Raymond Scott 
Berry attached hereto and made a part hereof by reference. 
DATED thisrj / day of June, 1985. 
GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry' N 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
JK4 3 
Page -1-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Julie King, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached 
Objection to Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Default Judgment upon the following parties by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Andrew B. Berry 
Attorney for Defendants 
100 Harmon Building 
3540 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah B4120 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, 
Utah on the r-y day of June, 1985. 
J X U U I^U^ 
to before me this oti~" 
Jotarv Public 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN Q ^ I K day of 
June, 1985. 
My commission expires 
N< 
Residfnch'at Salt Lake City, Utah 
Paqe -2-
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GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake^City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and RUBY 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Raymond Scott Berry, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That I am an attorney at law, in good standing and 
duly authorized to practice law in the State of Utah. 
2. I represent the Plaintiff herein. 
3. The facts herein stated are based upon my own 
knowledge and personal observations. 
4. I had engaged in several conversations with Andrew 
Berry, attorney for Defendants, subsequent to the commencement 
of these proceedings. The subject of those conversations was 
JUNZB 9 M AH'85 
H t j > f £ : ••••••; : V C U f R K 
DEPUTY CLERK 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. C-85-1606 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Paae -1-
whether Defendants Allwin W. and Vennadel Pierce would be 
willing to pay any sum to settle the claims made in this 
action. Counsel Andrew Berry indicated durinq those 
conversations he would discuss that matter with his clients. 
5. Andrew Berry at no time indicated to this Affiant 
that his clients would be willing to pay anything to settle 
this claim. 
6. At no time did this Affiant represent to Andrew 
Berry that any "settlement offer" would be acceptable to 
Plaintiff. This is particularly true in light of the fact that 
Defendants at no time made any settlement offer to the 
Plaintiff. 
7. Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel were 
served with Summons and Complaint in this action on or about 
March 30, 1985. 
8. On or about April 17, 1985, this Affiant spoke to 
Mr. Andrew Berry. I indicated during that phone conversation 
it was my intention to actively litigate this action, and 
further indicating that I expected an answer from Mr. Berry 
prior to the expiration of the time provided to answer. 
9. Mr. Berry did not ask for nor did this Affiant 
grant Mr. Berry any extension of time in which to answer 
Plaint iff's Complaint. 
10. That on or about April 22, 1985, this Affiant 
wrote to Mr. Berry confirming our phone conversation of April 
Page -2-
17, 1985 and indicated my intention to actively litigate the 
action. I indicated in that letter that I would be out of town 
on April 18 through May 5, 1985, but that I had instructed my 
office to review the file on April 20, 1985 and if no answer 
had been received, to see that Entry of Default and Default 
Judgment were submitted to the Court. 
11. A true and correct copy of ray letter dated April 
22, 1985, to Mr. Andrew Berry is attached hereto and made a 
part hereto and made a part hereof by reference as Affidavit 
Exhibit "A". 
12. On April 22, 1985, an Entry of Default was 
submitted to the court for the reason and on the grounds that 
no answer had been filed by Defendants. That Default was 
actually entered on or about April 30, 1985. 
13. That on or about May 14, 1985, a Default Judgment 
was submitted for entry by the court. That Default Judgment 
was actually entered by the court on or about May 17, 1985. 
14. That Mr. Andrew Berry at no time entered his 
appearance in the above-entitled action prior to his filing of 
a tardy Answer and Counterclaim on behalf of Defendants on or 
about May 30, 1985. 
DATED this rO /day of June, 1985. 
-V-£ { 
Raymond Scott Berry X^ 
Affiant / ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) f J 
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) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the ry~ { day of June, 1985, before me, the 
undersigned officer, personally appeared Raymond Scott Berry 
who is known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to 
the within instrument and individually acknowledged that he 
executed the same for the purposes therein contained. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
official seal this U^ / day of June, 1985. 
CI \idu ¥}x\\& 
Notary Public y ' \~j 
My commission expires: Residing at'-^ Jntf^  ^\Ci/Cl (?C(blV(xd\ 
w 85 J - • y 
JK43 
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GREEN, HIGGINS & BERRY 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
900 Nh WHOUSE BUILDING 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
SAL T LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801) 363-5650 
RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY p Q . BOX 1694, 84110 
April 22, 1985 
Andrew Berry 
Attorney at Law 
3540 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
RE: Katz vs. Pierce 
Our file: K-119.18-85 
Dear Mr. Berry: 
Thank you for your phone call of April 17, 1985 in regard 
to the above matter. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to communicate with Mr. Katz 
prior to his leaving town. 
My current intention is to actively litigate this matter. 
My file indicates that your answer is due on or before April 20, 
1985. I will be out of town on April 18, through May 5, 1985. 
However, I have instructed my office to review this file on April 
20. If no answer has been received, I have instructed my staff 
to see that a Entry of Default and Default Judgment is submitted 
to the court. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely yours, 
f"~"?>REEN & 
V.3c 
Raymond 
RSB/jk 
EXHIBIT A 
'ifUMBD] 
GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
h u d I v.« i., -.-u i ,i Uv* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and RUBY 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C-85-1606 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment came 
on regularly for hearing pursuant to Notice on July 26, 1985 at 
10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. 
Raymond Scott Berry appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Stan Katz. 
Counsel for the Defendants, Andrew Berry, did not appear on the 
grounds that he has been involved in a trial held before the 
Honorable Dean Conder. For this reason, and good cause 
appearing therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, AJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment was continued without date without prejudice to either 
party. 
Paae -1-
day of -drf^f, 1985. 
BY THE COURT; 
e of the District Court 
<-- jrS~ ~ /6*£ 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HtMOLTV 
DapvtyCtv* 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Julie King, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY 
attorneys for Plaintiffs herein, that she served the attached 
Order upon the following parties by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Andrew B. Berry 
Attorney for Defendants 
100 Harmon Building 
3540 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, 
Utah on the Q O day of^jmefy 1985. 
c \ l u Y^kXcx 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Bf-j-^ day of 
July, 1985. 
My commission expires: 
Notary Puplici 
Residing W(s_|lt Lake City, Utah 
JMM Q/f$? 
_.*}_ 
FIlFOINCtfFfS OFPCE 
ANDREW B. BERRY 0309 
\\0 
BERRY, LARSEN & FARR . i m . fp • g^  
Attorneys for Defendant Ho13 ' 
100 Harmon Building >d"j'.,--,'•;/ c: ^Kf 
3540 South 4000 West iA '.«.,", i>--' -/'-""' „ ^.„ ) 
West Va^Aey City, Utah 84120 /vil'?:^iH_i^--~-ii^ 
J^pj$»ne: 967-3700 r:;::rCLERK 
S » TTCi IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Civil No. C 85 1606 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
STAN KATZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and 
RUBY LARSON, 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
TO THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY: 
You and each of you will please take notice that 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment has 
been scheduled at the above-entitled Court, 451 South 200 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, Third Judicial District Court Judge, on the j££k day 
°f ffcuftuuLoT" i 1985, at the hour of jQidti /^ .-m. , or as soon 
thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED this ?C, day of July, 1985. 
ANDREW B, 
Attorney fap'"Defendants 
CERTICIATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this zJ day of July, 1985, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice, postage 
prepaid, to Raymond Scott Berry, attorney for Plaintiff, at 900 
Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and to Andy Childs, Judge Wilkinson's Clerk, at 240 East Fourth 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
] OlUt>-n 
GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STAN KATZ, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM 
vs. ) 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL ) 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and ) Civil No. C85-1606 
RUBY LARSON, ) 
) Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants. ) 
Plaintiff Stan Katz answers, denies and otherwise 
responds to the Counterclaim of Defendants filed herein as 
follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Defendants' Counterclaim fails to state a cause of 
action upon which relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Plaintiff responds to the specific allegations set 
forth in Defendant's Counterclaim as follows: 
1. The following Paragraphs of Defendants' 
Counterclaim are admitted: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 19. 
2. The allegations set forth in the remaining 
paragraphs of Defendants' Counterclaim are denied. 
3. Plaintiff specifically denies each and every 
Paqe 1 
wracJia!^ 
allegation set forth in Defendants' Counterclaim not 
specifically admitted above. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Defendants' 
Counterclaim be dismissed, no cause of action, and that 
Plaintiff be awarded his reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
of Court incurred in defense of the same. 
DATED this r^L/day of August, 1985. 
GREEN & BERRY 
1A 
Raymond Scott Berry 
Attorney for Plaint: 
JK48 
Paae 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Julie King, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached 
Reply to Counterclaim upon the following parties by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Andrew Berry 
Attorney at Law 
100 Harmon Building 
3540 South 4000 West 
West Valley, Utah 84120 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, 
>f August, 1985. 
p L C p a i U U I l t J L t J U H , ±11 UI1C UI 
Utah on t h e [7&LuZ\\6ay oi 
" U d a y ol SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o beforel/me t h i s ^ ' \ J d a y of 
August , 1 9 8 5 . 
C 
My commission expires: 
Lake City, Utah 
FILED IN CLEWS OFFIPE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
AUG fc 6 1965 GREEN S, BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Deputy' 
STAN 
vs. 
KATZ, 
i
Plaintiff, ) 
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL ) 
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and ) 
RUBY LARSON, ) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-1606 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment came 
on regularly for hearing pursuant to Notice on August 16, 1985 
at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, 
presiding. Raymond Scott Berry appeared on behalf of the 
Plaintiff Stan Katz. Andrew Berry appeared on behalf of the 
Defendants. The Court reviewed the pleadings on file, and 
entertained the arguments of counsel. Good cause appearing 
therefore, this Court orders, adjudges and decrees as follows: 
1. Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment dated March 15, 1985 is hereby denied. 
DATED t h i s / - ^ 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDUE* 
day of August, 1985. 
BY THE COURT; 
udge of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Julie Kingf being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached 
Order upon the following parties by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Andrew B. Berry 
Attorney at Law 
100 Harmon Building 
3540 South 4000 West 
West Valley, Utah 84120 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, 
Utah on the J^fj}^ day of August, 1985. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
August, 1985. 
Notary PtjbjLic 
ResidinqJ^4 Salt Lake City, Utah 
My commission expires: 
